If you looked at value theory in the Wikipedia (when I last did) or goodness... well I don't actually have the time right now to read the latest articles, but let's just say for the sake of argument, that neither of those articles make a very fine distinction between righteousness and benevolence. "Goodness" can have two very different meanings; "moral goodness" (righteousness) or what I will call "benevolence". I aim to define benevolence and give it a place in value theory.
But then I would also like to make the claim that a person cannot be righteous without at least benefiting someone (including themselves). And that might even be an absolute moral proposition. A person cannot be "righteous" (in a valuable way) without at least benefiting someone. A moral system which benefits no one is evil or irrational. So consequism does have some implications regarding what may be called "righteousness". See the problem of lacking omnibenevolence.
Lumenos 10:36, 26 February 2008 (CST)
Lumenos invented something ey called "consequism". Ey doesn't know if this should be called a "value theory" or an normative ethical theory. It looks most like a value theory, more like a normative ethical theory than a metaethical theory. In what sense are these "theories" at all? Can they be proven or disproven? Do they make propositions/claims? Various consequist theories do make propositions/claims about what seem to be universal values of sentient beings, but consequism itself is so broad as to perhaps be nothing more than a truism. So really, the question is whether the consequist theories constitute normative ethical theories, etc. Consequism is more like a hypothesis (ie definable and provable) than some other Lumenati concepts, but may be merely a mythosis. Consequism is definable and some aspects of consequism are (in some sense) provable, but we may never have the ability to prove them and other aspects of consequism are merely a matter of definition.